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Respondent Kirk Jackson by and through his attorneys of record, Merrill and Merrill
Chartered, states his Respondent's Brief as follows:
ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Summary of the Case

This is a water rights case of first impression in which the Appellants Chad and Jane
Barnes ("Barnses" herein) ask this Court to expand the forfeiture doctrine in a manner that has
never been recognized by the Idaho Courts. Specifically, the Bamses asks this Court to find that
when a predecessor property owner indisputably does not have enough water for the entire
property, and chooses to use all of his available water for only a portion of his land, he thereby
forfeits his water rights for subsequent purchasers of the un-watered portion of land upon
partition of the tract. Such a decision would result in a finding that Respondent Kirk Jackson,
("Jackson" herein), the subsequent purchaser for value of the p01iion the Bamses claim was
unwatered, takes his parcel without any water rights whatsoever, and that the Barnses thereby
obtained all the water rights that originally ran appurtenant to both parcels when they were
unified. Barnes asks for this result even though it is undisputed that the predecessor owner of
the two unified parcels, Craig Bloxham ("Bloxham" herein) "beneficially used his water right,
all that was available to him, at all times in question."

(R. 465, Decision on Motion for

Reconsideration p. 9). Forfeiture of water rights is strongly disfavored under Idaho law. This
Court has expressly stated that water rights cannot be forfeited by nonuse if the water was
unavailable. Sagew illow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res. , 138 Idaho 831 , 843 , 70 P.3d 669,_
Respondent's Brief
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(2003).

In the "Monarch Decision," the Snake River Basin Adjudication recognized the

Sagewillow defense to water forfeiture to be water unavailability.

In Re SRBA Case No. 39576

(lvfonarch Greenback, LLC), Dec. 9, 2009, pp. 14-15. The SRBA had held previously that " [i]n
order for a water right to be forfeited water must be available to satisfy the water right during the
alleged period of nonuse."
(emphasis added).

Wood v. Trout, SRBA subcase no. 65-05663B (May 9, 2002),

Because this Court has never measured forfeiture by examining how the

water was applied to the land, and because this Court has never held that water rights could be
forfeited when there was not enough water to fulfill the right, and because it is undisputed that
the parent water rights on the unified parcel were always fully put to beneficial use, this Court
should reject the Barnes' invitation to expand the forfeiture doctrine and affirm the District
Court decision.
Although the District Court did not reach this issue, because it found that there was no
forfeiture at all, this Court may also affirm on the alternative grounds that the Idaho forfeiture
statute was tolled while the property in question was in bankruptcy, from October 12, 2005 , until
April 2012 when Jackson purchased the property from the bankruptcy trustee. (R 251-253,
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment). If this Court agrees, it must also grant summary judgment in favor of Jackson and
against the Barnses, because the statutory period of forfeiture was not met on this record.
This Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Barnses' claim on
alternative grounds, because the evidence is undisputed that Jackson resumed partial use of the
Respondent's Brief
11406: Respondents. Bri ef

Page 2

water on his parcel in 2012, and he resumed full use of water on his parcel in April 2013 . The
District Court found this evidence to be undisputed for purposes of summary judgment analysis.
(R. 458, Decision on Motion to Reconsider p. 2, fn 5; R. 408 , Decision on Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 9).

The Barnses did not make a claim of right until they filed their lawsuit in

August 2014. Even if this Court agrees that the water rights on Jackson's parcel were forfeited,
Jackson's undisputed resumption of use before the Barnses made a claim of right leads to the
same conclusion, and Barnes' claims must be dismissed.
To avoid the resumption of use defense to dismiss their claim of forfeiture , the Barnses
ask this Court to find that they may rely on the continued use of water rights by the predecessor
owner of the entire parcel, Bloxham, to pre-empt Jackson's undisputed resumption of use
argument. The Barnses ask this Court to treat Bloxham as a third party in interest asserting
water rights on what subsequently became the Barnes ' parcel before Jackson resumed use on his
parcel. This Court must reject this contention for the same reason that the District Court rejected
it. The property was in bankruptcy from 2005 until Jackson purchased a part of the property in
2012, and the Barnses purchased the remaining parcel in 2014.

(R.184-186, Bloxham

Banrkputcy Petition; R. 281-283 Trustee's Deed to Jackson; R.304-306 ; R. 310-314 Quitclaim
Deed from Bloxham to his parents ; R. 315-317 General Warranty Deed to Barnses).

Bloxham

was always the legal title owner until the property was sold through the Bankruptcy Trustee to
Jackson, and through Bloxham' s parents to Barnes.

Bloxham was indisputably in continuous

physical control of the property. (R 57-63 , Bloxham Affidavit). Bloxham himself testified that
Respondent's Brief
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he considered himself the owner of the parcels until they were sold. (R. 60, Bloxham Affidavit
page 4, , 16).

As the District Court found, Bloxham could not be a third party in interest to his

own property.
This argument is additionally illogical: The Bamses ask this Court to treat Bloxham as
the senior water rights holder able to forfeit the water rights Jackson otherwise would have
taken, and at the same time ask this Court to treat Bloxham as the junior water rights/third party
based on the same conduct on the same property, thereby preventing Jackson from resuming use
on the very same forfeiture. He is asking this Court to hold, through legal tap dancing, that
Bloxham created the forfeiture because he owned the property to which the water right attached,
and simultaneously prevented any resumption of use to defeat the forfeiture because he was a
third party to the same forfeiture. The forfeiture rules are intended to protect junior water rights
holder's expectations of "moving up in the queue" when senior water rights are not put to
beneficial use for five years or more. They are intended to prevent waste or hoarding of water,
or monopolization of water rights. See Peter R. Anderson and Aaron J. Kraft, Why does Idaho 's
Water Law Regime Provide for Fo,feiture of Water Rights? 48 Idaho L. Rev. 419 (2012). They
are not intended to permit a landowner at his sole discretion to concentrate his water rights into a
single parcel when he partitions his property, presumably thereby increasing the prope1iy value
of the parcel he retains. This Comi must reject a rule of law that would permit a property owner
to forfeit water rights without any possibility of resumption of those rights by a derivative claim
of equal priority, based on such legal gymnastics.
Respondent's Brief
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Taking these arguments together, the Bamses are asking this Court to craft a rule of
forfeiture that would tum Idaho water rights law on its head. The Barnses are asking for a rule
of law that would permit landholders to select parts of their land to concentrate their water rights
through their water distribution, and to keep those full water rights on a smaller parcel than the
original right provided simply by partitioning the land. Such a rule would encourage private
land owners essentially to hoard and monopolize water rights to increase property values on
smaller pieces of land, instead of using the water rights fully to benefit the lands to which they
were originally assigned . Over time, this could restrict water rights allocation throughout the
state of Idaho, as water rights become concentrated on smaller parcels, and selectively neglected
parcels are left without any water rights. It could additionally permit the Idaho Department of
Water Resources to take away water rights through forfeiture for farmers or ranchers who do not
have enough water to fully utilize their acreage, and who must therefore make business decisions
about how to best distribute and utilize the water they get.
This rule of law advocated by the Barnses would require landowners to spread their water
use proportionally to every inch of their land or risk losing their water rights, regardless of
whether spreading their water this way puts it to the most efficient and beneficial use. This rule
of law would make it extraordinarily difficult to negotiate fair market value of land having water
rights, because it would require purchasers and lenders to try to determine whether the parcel
they want to purchase has forfeited water rights before a partition through selective nonwatering, even though there is no record of such forfeiture , and evidence of forfeiture would not
Respondent's Brief
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always be apparent on visual inspection of the property. This has never been the law of Idaho .
This Court must reject this invitation to change Idaho water rights law in a way that invites
inequitable results and thwarts public policy.
B.

Prior Proceedings

Jackson does not disagree substantially with Barnes' recitation and characterization of
the Course of Proceedings, Appellant's Brief pages 2-5, with two exceptions: First, the District
Court did not make any findings regarding whether Bloxham had ever watered the ·Jackson
parcel, 29-14032. (R. 485; Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment p. 6). The facts are in
dispute on this issue. (See Appellants' Brief page 7, footnote 4; Appellant's Brief page 8, citing
R. at 168, 181-82). This dispute of fact was not material to the Judge's decision below, and it is
not material to a determination on appeal. The District Court found, even assuming Bloxham's
assertions to be true, (that he did not water the section of his land which subsequently became
Jackson's parcel between the years 2004-2012), his conduct did not amount to forfeiture of any
water rights on the entire parcel to which they were assigned as a matter of law. Jackson notes
however, this dispute of material fact prevents an award of summary judgment in the Barnses'
favor, and it would make it very difficult for them to meet their evidentiary burden of proof of
clear and convincing evidence of forfeiture if this case were remanded for trial.
Second, although the District Court did not reverse its prior decision on reconsideration
of summary judgment, the District Court did clarify its findings on beneficial use. ( R. 495-501,
Decision on Motion for Reconsideration). The District Court additionally specifically addressed
Respondent's Brief
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and rejected the Barnes' claim that they could rely on Bloxham's assertion of water rights as a
third party in interest. (R. 502-504, Decision on Motion to Reconsideration).

C.

Statement of Facts

As a threshold matter, Respondent Kirk Jackson agrees and stipulates that the map
provided in Appellant's Brief, Addendum A, page 2, is a true and accurate depiction of the
current boundaries for the Water Rights Points of Use for both the Jackson (29-14032) and the
Barnes' (29-14115) properties. Jackson includes in his brief as an Addendum pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 35(g) the aerial maps depicting the original Bloxham Water Rights Points of Use
for the property when it was unified (29-10420). These maps were relied on, in part, by the
Barnses in creating Addendum A to Appellant's Brief.
Craig Bloxham is one of the predecessor owners of a single parcel of property, with a
single water right, Water Right 29-10420, located in the town Downey, Bannock County, Idaho.
(R. 57-63, Bloxham affidavit). The other owner of the property was Eagle Eyes, Ltd., which it
appears from the record was intended to be a holding company for the Bloxham family, although
the record is unclear.

(See R. 271-276, Exhibit 2, Wells Affidavit, Bankruptcy Motion to

Approve Sale, p. 2, § 3). Bloxham and his parents, Vern and Delores Bloxham, obtained title to
the property in 1992. (R. 271-276

~

3) Vern and Delores Bloxham subsequently conveyed their

interest in the property to a trust, which subsequently conveyed the trust interest to Eagle Eyes,
Ltd . (R. 271-276

~

3). It appears from the record that Bloxham never conveyed his interest in

the property the Eagle Eyes, Ltd. Trust, (R. 271-276
Respondent's Brief
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least initially disclose his interest in the property to the bankruptcy court. (R. 184-186, Petition
for Bankruptcy).
On March 22, 2004, the SRBA Water Court issued a Partial Decree of Water Right 2910420, for owners Craig V. Bloxham and Vern Bloxham. (R 278-279, Partical Decree for Water
Right 29-10420 Exh 3 Wells Affidavit). Water Right 29-10420 is diverted from a source known
locally as Spring Creek. This Water Right permitted seasonal irrigation of 2 .24 CFS, and annual
stockwater of .03 CFS. at the place of use. The Water Right 29-10420 referenced Water Right
29-10419 with combined use limits, but the record below is unclear as to any relationship
between the Bloxhams and the owners of Water Right 29- 10419. Water Right 29-10420 states
that "this right is limited to the irrigation of 112.0 acres within the place of use described above
in a single irrigation season." The evidence is undisputed that Water Right 29-10420 is the
parent water right for both the Jackson's Water Right 10432, and the Barnes' Water Right,
14115 . (See R. 288-293, Proof of Water Right Exhibit 6, Wells Affidavit).
Craig Bloxham filed for bankruptcy on October 12, 2005. The evidence is undisputed
that Bloxham used and controlled the real property interests in this dispute throughout the period
of bankruptcy, and until the property was sold by partition, first one parcel to Jackson in 2012,
and then the second parcel to Barnes in 2014. (R.184-186, Bloxham Bankruptcy Petition; R.
281 -283 Trustee's Deed to Jackson; R.304-306; R. 310-314 Quitclaim Deed from Bloxham to
his parents; R. 315-317 General Warranty Deed to Barnses). The evidence is additionally
undisputed that Bloxham held record title to the property, by operation of law, throughout the
Respondent's Brief
11406: Respondents. Brief
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bankruptcy. (R. 310-314 ). The evidence is undisputed that Bloxham considered himself the
owner of the property during the period of bankruptcy. (R. 60, Bloxham Affidavit page 4, ~ 16).
On April 26, 2012, Jackson purchased a portion of the property owned by Craig Bloxham
from the bankruptcy trustee. (R. 281 -283 Trustee's Deed to Kirk Jackson) . Jackson purchased
the property with the intent to living there, and planting a twenty acre orchard to be watered by
Spring Creek. (R. 257-260, Jackson Aff. , ~ 8). Jackson believed when he purchased the property
from the Bankruptcy Trustee that he was acquiring water rights inherited from the parent parcel
of land, amounting to approximately forty percent of the water available for diversion from
Spring Creek. (R. 259 Jackson Aff.

~

28). Shortly after purchasing the property, Jackson

approached Vern Bloxham requesting access to a diversion structure and pipeline he believed
was owned by Vern, so that he could take his water out of the historical diversion point. Vern
Bloxham told Jackson he would not permit that use. (R. 258,

~~

4, 5).

Jackson decided to avoid conflict with his neighbors, so he found another way to access
his water rights. Jackson spent $2,000 to purchase an easement from another neighbor, so that
he could construct a pipeline and diversion structure to get the water from Spring Creek to his
property. (R. 258 , ~

~

6, 7) . In May or June 2012, Jackson planted over one hundred fruit trees

on his property. Jackson began digging a pipeline for his irrigation system. Jackson worked
with the Idaho Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS herein) to design a diversion
system that would use forty percent of the water from Spring Creek. The NRCS shared costs for
the portion of the system that would be used for stock water. (R. 258) .
Respondent's Brief
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On May 31 , 2012, Jackson filed his Notice of Change of Water Right Ownership with the
Idaho Depaiiment of Water Resources (IDWR herein). (R. 213 Exhibit F attached to Affidavit of
Robert Han-is). Water Right number 29-10420 was split into two Water Rights, 29-14031 and
29-14032.

Jackson obtained 29-14032, and Craig Bloxham retained 29-14031. (R. 288-293 ,

Proof of Water Right).
While Jackson's diversion system was being installed, Jackson began using the water
from Spring Creek to the best of his ability. From July to September, 2012, Jackson hauled
water to his trees from Spring Creek with a 500 gallon water truck, four to five days a week. (R.
165-168 ; Depo. Kirk Jackson p. 53-55). Beginning in April of 2013 and continuing through July
of 2013 , Jackson pumped water from Spring Creek to his property to in-igate ten (10) acres of
wheat he planted there. Jackson rented a pump to in-igate the wheat, and he continued to water
his orchard. (R. 168-171 , Depo. Kirk Jackson p. 55-58), In the fall of 2014, Jackson used his
water to in-igate his ground as part of his fall planting. (R 171-173, Depo. Kirk Jackson, p. 5860).
Jackson testified, and his testimony was unrebutted, that the flow rate of Spring Creek
was around 240 gallons per minute, and that it does not change substantially throughout the year.
(R. 259, Jackson Affidavit,~ 16). Jackson testified about his experience and training in building
and using weirs to measure water flow. (R. 259, Jackson Affidavit ~~ 17-21). Jackson testified,
and his testimony was unrebutted, that his permitted water right, 29-114032, was for .840 cfs,
which equates to 377.01 gallons per minute. (R. 279, Jackson Affidavit,
Respondent's Brief
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testified that the flow rate of Spring Creek was insufficient to satisfy his full water right, which
was approximately forty percent of the parent water right belonging to Craig Bloxham, 2910420.

(R. 279, Jackson Affidavit,

~~

23-24).

Jackson testified, and his testimony was

unrebutted, that he took all the available water out of Spring Creek to which he was entitled,
forty percent of the water available from Spring Creek based on flow rate, and he put that water
to beneficial use watering his trees and ten acres of a wheat crop, from April to July 2013. ( R.
259, Jackson Affidavit

~

25-27).

In 2014, Jackson's pipeline and diversion structure was

completed, and he used it to divert his forty percent of the Spring Creek water to irrigate his fall
crop of wheat and sainfoin. (R. 259, Jackson Affidavit~~ 26, 27).
Chad and Jane Barnes purchased their parcel from Vern and Delores Bloxham. (R. 315317 General Warranty Deed to Barnses). The Barnses applied to change the ownership of Water
Right 29-14031 , which was still owned by Craig and Vern Bloxham. (R. 303 , Notice of Change
in Water Right Ownership, Exh. 9 Wells Affidavit). IDWR split Water Right 29-14031 and
created Water Right 29-14115 , the Barnes' water right. Thus, Bloxham' s Water Right is still 2914031; Jackson ' s Water Right is 29-14032; and the Barnes' Water Right is 14115. All three
rights came from the parent right, 29-10420. (R. 308, Pedigree Search, Exh 10 Wells Affidavit).
In July 2015 , Craig Bloxham destroyed Kirk Jackson ' s headgate, curtailing Jackson' s
ability to take his water. Bloxham was charged with and he pled guilty to a misdemeanor, Idaho
Code § 18-14306.

(R. 299-301).

He was ordered to pay Jackson $3 ,534.14 for restitution.

Respondent's Brief
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Jackson testified that as of October 17, 2016, Bloxham had paid him only $70. (R. 260, Jackson
Affidavit, ,i 36).
The facts are undisputed that due to the Snake River Basin Adjudication tolling periods,
any claim of forfeiture must be for conduct occurring in 2004 or beyond (and not considering
other tolling periods such as the bankruptcy stay). (R. 355, Decision on Motion for Summary
Judgment, fn. 14 & fn. 15) Craig Bloxham has testified that he did not water what subsequently
became the Jackson property at all from 2004-2012. (R. 60, Bloxham affidavit ,i 16). This is the
factual basis for his claim of forfeiture of the water rights for the Jackson' s Water Rights, 2914032. Jackson testified that he personally observed flood irrigation on the property shortly
before he purchased it (R.156-162, Depo. Kirk Jackson pp. 26-49). Craig Bloxham testified that
he "actively irrigated" the portion of his property that became the Barnses' parcel before and
after he sold the Jackson parcel. (R. 61, Bloxham Affidavit ,i 20). This is the factual basis for his
third- party claim ofright, to prevent Jackson's claim of resumption of use. Jackson disputes the
Barnes' evidence that Bloxham actively irrigated what subsequently became their property after
2012. Jackson testified that based on his personal observations, the parcel that subsequently
became the Barnses' was "dry farmed" by Jackson's friend Dow Barker from 2012-2013, and
that there were no apparent active attempts to irrigate the property until it was purchased by the
Barnes in 2014. (R. 260. Jackson Affidavit ,i 29-35). The evidence is undisputed that there was
not enough water in Spring Creek to irrigate Bloxham's entire property when it was unified, or

Respondent's Brief
11406: Respondents.Bri ef

Page 12

to fulfill the water rights he owned when the property was unified, 29-10420.

(R. 117, Depa

Kirk Jackson, p. 117, lines 13-19; R. 61 , Bloxham Affidavit~ 19).

II.
A.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Can a water right be forfeited solely on an un-watered section of property that is
subsequently partitioned, where all the available water assigned to the parent
water right was fully put to beneficial use?

B.

Did the fact of Bloxham' s bankruptcy and the automatic stay provisions of
11.U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) toll the five-year statutory period required for forfeiture , so
that the "clock" for forfeiture did not begin to run until the Jackson property was
removed from bankruptcy?

C.

Can an owner and beneficial user of a water right simultaneously forfeit the water
right as the parent holder of the water right, and also assert a third-party claim of
right to prevent the resumption of use of that same derivative water right?

D.

Did the District Court err in denying the Bamses' motion for summary judgment,
and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Jacksons.

III.

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

Jackson does not disagree with the Barnes' assertion of the appropriate standard of
review. Jackson would add that under the summary judgment standard of review, I.R.C.P. Rule
56(a) , a District Court " may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party
has not filed its own motion with the court." Harwood v. Talb ert, 136 Idaho 672 , 677 , 39 P.3 d
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612, 617 (2001); See also Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 855,
318 P.3d 622,624 (2014).
In denying or granting summary judgment in a water rights forfeiture case, this Court
must also consider the burden of proof required on the ultimate issue. Because water right
forfeitures are disfavored under Idaho law, the paiiy asserting forfeiture must prove the
forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 138
Idaho 831,836, 70 P.3d 669,974 (2003) (Sagewillow JI). Additionally, although the owner of a
water right must raise an affirmative defense to statutory forfeiture, the burden of persuasion
remains ont eh party claiming forfeiture, to disprove the defense. Id.

Clear and convincing

evidence is generally understood to be "evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly
probable or reasonably certain." In Re Delivery Call of A&B Irrigation Dist. , 153 Idaho 500,
516,284 P.3d 225,241 (2012).
If the paiiy asserting forfeiture cannot meet that burden of proof as a matter. of law,

summary judgment is properly granted against that party.

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. THERE WAS NO FORFEITURE OF WATER RIGHTS, BECAUSE ALL
WATER AVAILABLE TO THE PARENT PARCEL 29-10420 WAS PUT TO
BENEFICIAL USE
The legal elements of a water right in Idaho are: source, priority date, amount (either in
annual volume or rate of flow, or both), period of use, purpose of use, point of diversion, and
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place of use. Olsen v. IDWR, 105 Idaho 98,666 P.2d 188 (1983); Idaho Code§ 42-1411.11. The
purpose of use element co1Telates with the Idaho Constitutional requirement that all water rights
be put to "beneficial use." Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3 (defining "beneficial uses" to include
agricultural; domestic uses, manufacturing, mining and hydropower); See Jeffrey C. Fe1Teday et
al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK, Givens Pursley LLP 2017, p. 22.
http: //vvv.iw.Qivenspurslev.com/assets/publications/handbooks/handbook-waterlaw.pclf
The Idaho legislature requires "[t]he appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial
purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for such purpose,
the right ceases." Idaho Code § 42-104. "Beneficial use" for purpose of establishing or finding a
water right has not been defined precisely by Idaho statute or case law, with some exception.
Generally, in appropriating a water right, the State refers to very general or broad purposes of
use, such as "irrigation," or "industrial," or "commercial." Id. at page 23. The concept of
beneficial use itself arises from the general and well-grounded legal principle inherent in the
appropriation doctrine: that in lands where water is scarce, water must not be wasted, and it
must be put at all times to beneficial use. No one is entitled to more water than they can put to
beneficial use at any given place or time. Id. at page 28, fn. 38.
Although the Idaho Constitution defines certain uses of water in Idaho as "beneficial,"
Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3, prior decisions of this Court, and the former Snake River Basin
Adjudication court, explain that these definitions are not exclusive. State of Idaho, Dep 't of
Parks v. IDWR , 96 Idaho 440, 447, 530 P.2d 924, 931 (1974); In re SRBA , Case No. 395 76,
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Idaho Dist. Ct. , Fifth Jud . Dist. (Basin-Wide Issue No . 00-91014, Amended Consent Decree,
Feb. 25, 2009) ("Under Idaho law, any person may establish a diversionary water right,
including to and from storage, for aesthetic, recreational or wildlife purposes").
The Idaho legislature has also defined some specific "beneficial uses" of water in Idaho.
Idaho Code § 42-222 (municipalities holding water rights for anticipated future use is "beneficial
use"); Idaho Code§§ 42-1501 to 42-1505 (certain instream uses are "beneficial uses").
These legal definitions of "beneficial use" in Idaho, the Idaho Constitution, Idaho case
law, and Idaho statutes, refer to the way water is being used. None of these definitions refer to
the separate element of a water right, place of use, as being intrinsically tied to or a requirement
for dete1mining whether or not a particular use of water is beneficial.
The "place of use" element of a water right refers to the requirement that a specific legal
description be attached to the right, again with some specific statutory exceptions that do not
apply to this case. It is a statutory requirement that the place of diversion where the water is
being beneficially used is legally described. Idaho Code § 42-219. The place of use statutory
definition in no way suggests that a determination of beneficial use is defined by the place of
use . Rather, place of use is required to determine the land to which the right is appurtenant, and
where the beneficial use will occur.
In 2004 , the Idaho legislature amended the Idaho Code to provide that "consumptive use"
is no longer considered an element of a water right in Idaho. Consumptive use is defined as the
actual volume of water consumed in the course of use or otherwise made unavailable to other
Respondent's Brief
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users.

Idaho Code § 42-202B(l).

Changes in consumptive use within a water right do not

require a transfer permit in Idaho. Effectively, this means that landowners are free to change
their consumptive use within their place of use, and within their water rights generally,
considering all the other elements.
Jackson does not deny herein and did not deny below the case law Barnes has cited for
the proposition that if water rights are not put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive
years, those rights may be lost to statutory forfeiture.

Idaho Code § 42-422; Gilbert v. Smith, 97

Idaho 735, 552 P.2d 1220 (1976); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727,
94 7 P.2d 400 (1997)(recognizing the concept of "partial forfeiture") .

Forfeiture is the

inexcusable failure to put full water rights to beneficial use. Id.
In Hagerman, this Court noted that partial forfeiture should be recognized by Idaho,
because otherwise a water user could hold the water against all subsequent appropriators by
using only a part of the water. Hagerman, 94 7 P .2d at 408 (emphasis added). "If a water user
cannot apply a portion of a water right to beneficial use during any part of the statutory period,

but must waste the water in order to divert the fidl amount of the water right, a forfeiture has
taken place." Id. (emphasis added). This Court in Hagerman was clearly and correctly focused
on the nonuse of water as the correct measure of partial forfeiture. Similarly, in Wood v. Troutt ,
SRBA subcase no . 65-05663B (May 9, 2002) the SRBA court stated, " [i]n order for a water right
to be forfeited water must be available to satisfy the water right during the alleged period of nonuse. "
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There is no case law in Idaho, and none can be found in other jurisdictions, and none is
cited in Barnes' brief to this Court or to the District Court, to support the assertion that if a
landowner does not have enough water to satisfy his entire water rights, but he fully puts the
water he gets to beneficial use, he has nonetheless forfeited his water rights because he did not
water his entire place of use. In a land of scarce water resources, and particularly during drought
seasons as Southeastern Idaho has experienced in recent years, such a rule of law makes no
sense.

As this Court has stated:
The water of this arid state is an important resource. Not only
farmers, but industry and residential users depend on it. Because
Idaho receives little annual precipitation, Idahoans must make the
most efficient use of this limited resource. The policy of the law
of this State is to secure the maximum use and benefit, and least
wasteful use, of its water resources.

Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901,904, 792 P.2d 926,929 (1990).
The forfeiture rule Barnes would have this Court adopt flies in the face of this longrecognized water rights policy, because it ties the hands of Idaho water users by requiring them
to spread all their water evenly among the entire acreage assigned as their place of use,
regardless of whether this distribution of water secures maximum use and benefit of water
resources.
Jackson does not deny the law cited by Barnes that states that water users are not
permitted to "waste" water. Idaho Code § 42-220 ; Hagerman , 130 Idaho at 735 , 947 P.2d at
408.
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It is a cardinal principle established by law and the adjudications of this court that
the highest and greatest duty of water be required. The law allows the
appropriator only the amount actually necessary for the useful or beneficial
purpose to which he applies it.

Munn v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 43 Idaho 198, 207, 252 P. 865 (1926).
This is indisputably the law of Idaho. This rule of law, however, is not at all applicable
to the facts of this case. There is absolutely no evidence on this record that Bloxham "wasted"
water when the property and water right were unified in 29-10420, and Barnes does not
reference any evidence of water waste on this record. See Appellant's Briefp. 19. The evidence
is undisputed that there was not enough water to satisfy Bloxham's rights to water his entire
place of use under the parent rights 29-10420. There is no evidence that Bloxham used more
water than was required to meet his beneficial use. Bloxham's decisions of where to use the
water within his place of use, which indisputably was not enough to satisfy his entire water right,
does not amount to a forfeiture of his water rights.
When water rights are first appropriated by the State, by necessity the State must
consider the beneficial use to which the water will be put, and the number of irrigated acres that
right will encompass. Idaho Code § 42-220. This of course is to help make sure that the water
appropriated will be put to beneficial use, and water will not be wasted. It does not logically
follow, however, that when there is not enough water in any given year, or for a number of years,
a landowner will lose their water rights if they do not spread the water out in direct and precise
proportion to that acreage. Water users in Idaho have the discretion and must have the discretion

Respondent's Brief
I 1406 : Respondents.Brief

Page 19

to determine how and where they will use their water within their place of use, as is evidenced
by the 2004 statutory elimination of the consumption of use element of a water right.

If

landowners do not use their entire water right allocated, or if they waste water, they may forfeit
their rights under Idaho case law cited above. If, however, landowners must make hard choices
about where and how to apply their water rights to beneficial use when water is scarce, and when
the evidence is undisputed there was not enough water to irrigate the entire acreage assigned to
their place of use, there is no logical or public policy reason to find statutory forfeiture.
Barnes is correct in noting that water rights are appurtenant to the land, and a division of
land divides appurtenant water rights in direct proportion. Russell v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, 118 P.
501 ( 1911 ). This rule of law is exactly why the Idaho Department of Water Resources assigned
Jackson approximately forty percent of the water rights inherited from the parent water right because Jackson had purchased approximately forty percent of the original parcel that contained
the parent water right.

The water rights belonged to the entire parcel of land when it was

unified. If Bloxham forfeited his rights , fully or partially, that forfeiture must also apply to the
entire parcel that contained Water Right 29-10420. This becomes impossible to measure in the
instant case, however, because a water right refers to beneficial use of the water, and not
beneficial use of the land to which the water right is appurtenant. There is nothing at all in the
legal definition of a water right by its elements, or in the legal definition of "beneficial use" in
Idaho , that suggest otherwise. Bloxham fully used his water rights beneficially to irrigate his
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land for crops within his place of use between the years 2004 and 2012. There was no forfeiture
that can be measured.
In their Motion to Reconsider filed in the District Court, the Bamses relied heavily on
this Court's decision in Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 831 P.2d 527 (1992). In that case, this
Court affirmed the underlying decision of the Idaho Department of Water Resources. The water
right at issue covered three different fields, totaling ninety-six (96) acres. The third field was six
(6) acres. Dobson objected to a transfer of water rights, arguing that approving the transfer
would result in an enlargement because part of the water right had been forfeited for nonuse.
The Director concluded that the consumptive use appurtenant to the six-acre field had been
forfeited by nonuse, but the Director did not reduce the amount which had historically been
diverted for the fields , concluding that the transfer would not change the amount of use
authorized by the water right. The District Court concluded, and this Court agreed, that the
Director's determination was supported by substantial and competent evidence. As this Court
noted in Hagerman, 947 P.2d at 404, this Court's decision in the Dovel case was fact specific,
and did not tum on any interpretation of forfeiture law.
Dovel was decided before the Idaho legislature removed consumptive use of water as a

consideration in determining whether a water right exists. Idaho Code § 42-202B(l). This is
significant.

If Dovel applies at all to this forfeiture analysis, the case now stands for the

proposition that prior to 2004, lack of consumptive use on acreage could give rise to a forfeiture
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claim made when those rights were being transferred. Since consumptive use can no longer be
considered in determining whether a water right exists, Dovel really stands for the proposition
that no forfeiture can occur today based on lack of consumptive use on only a portion of the
property.
Finally, it should be noted that water rights lost through forfeiture are supposed to revert
to the state as unappropriated water.

Jenkins v. State Dep 't of Water Resources, 103 Idaho 384,

647 P.2d 1256 (1982). As the Idaho Water Law Handbook explains:
This does not mean that, say, a forfeited 1871-priority water right
can be picked up and diverted under that priority by another water
user. Rather, by eliminating this right from the priority line, more
junior rights effectively "move up the ladder" or become that much
more reliable because they have fewer senior rights in front of
them.
Ferreday et al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK, page 39.
There are no policy arguments for the forfeiture rule that support Barnes' interpretation. The
reasons for the forteiture rule have been described as follows:

1) to "clear" the water rights

queue; 2) to promote economic development as junior rights move up the queue; 3) conservation
of resources; 4) incentivizing participation in desirable water use practices, such as water
banking. See Anderson & Kraft, Why Does Idaho 's Water Law Regime Provide for Forfeiture of

Water Rights, 48 Idaho L. Rev. 419, 440-446 (2012). Under the Barnes' view of this case,
Bloxham had the right to concentrate his water rights onto one part of his place of use by
changing his consumptive use, and then partition the un-watered portion of his place of use, but
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still keep the "forfeited" water as a "third party in interest" or junior water rights holder to his

own water right.

No one benefits from this interpretation of Idaho water law except for

Bloxham, and his successor in interest, the Barnses, as their property values are enhanced by
more concentrated water rights on a smaller acreage than was originally appropriated, at the
expense of Jackson' s property which is devalued due to the loss of water rights.

B.

THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
BANKRUPTCY CODE TOLLED THE STATUTORY PERIOD OF
FORFEITURE, AND THE CLOCK DID NOT RUN ON FORFEITURE
WHILE THE JACKSON PROPERTY WAS IN BANKRUPTCY

Although the District Court did not decide the case on this issue, this Court can affirm the
granting of summary judgment in favor of Jackson on the alternative grounds raised below,
because there is no dispute of material facts on this issue.

When a debtor files a bankruptcy

petition, an automatic stay immediately arises . 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The stay provisions, 11
U.S.C . § 362(3), prohibit "any act to obtain possession of property of the state or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate."

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(l)

provides that property continues to be protected by the state so long as the property remains in
the bankruptcy estate. The stay " is designed to effect an immediate freeze of the status quo by
precluding and nullifying post-petition actions, judicial or non-judicial , in nonbamkuptcy forums
against .. . or affecting the property of the estate." In Re Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d 581 , 585 (91h
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Cir. 1993). "Accordingly, section 362 is extremely broad in scope and should apply to almost
any type of formal or informal action against. .. the property of the estate."

Delpit v.

Commissioner, 18 F.3d 768, 771 (9 1h Cir. 1994).
The Barnses object to this Court allowing the bankruptcy stay to toll the forfeiture
statutory period, stating that tolling of a statute is not an "act" that can be stayed by the federal
statutes. The Barnses mischaracterize the application of the stay provisions. It is not the Idaho
statute that is being stayed by federal bankruptcy law; it is Bloxham's actions of alleged
forfeiture that are being stayed. While the property was in bankruptcy, Bloxham was not entitled
to take any actions that could affect the property value or disposition. This includes, by the
Barnses' theory, choosing to water or not to water the property that would subsequently become
the Jackson's property. Any actions or willful inactions Bloxham took while the property was in
bankruptcy should not be counted under Idaho's foreclosure statute under these federal
bankruptcy provisions.
The Bamses next object that because the bankruptcy code contains its own tolling statute,
11.U.S.C. § 108(b), the federal tolling statute controls. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) is inapplicable. That
tolling statute applies to nonbankruptcy laws that fix a time for a debtor to cure a default or "any
other similar act." Forfeiture of water rights is not curing default or a similar act.
Next, the Barnses object that the bankruptcy code excepts the automatic state from
barring the "commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit .. . to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police or regulatory power."
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U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). This statute does not on its face apply to this forfeiture proceeding, which
was not brought by any governmental unit. It was brought by private parties, the Barnses.
As noted by the District Court, Bloxham was still the property title owner throughout the
pendency of the bankruptcy, and he was also by operation of law the holder of the appurtenant
water right. Bloxham was stayed from taking any action that could affect the property during the
pendency of the bankruptcy, which would include deciding whether to water any part of his land.
Idaho's forfeiture statutory period was tolled by operation of bankruptcy law. This Court can
affirm the dismissal of Barnses' case and affirm the award of summary judgment to Jackson on
this basis.
Finally, the Barnses complaint that application of the automatic stay provisions of the
bankruptcy code would "enlarge or create" substantive property rights as defined by state law.
Appellant's Brief, page 28. Applying the bankruptcy stay to toll the Idaho forfeiture statute does
not enlarge or create substantive property rights.

It prevents the property values from being

manipulated through non-use of water rights or concentrated use of water rights to ·cause a
forfeiture of valuable property rights. This is the very reason for the bankruptcy code stay: to
prevent the judgement debtor or anyone else from taking action that could affect the value of
property to be distributed in bankruptcy.
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C. THE FACTS ARE UNDISPUTED THAT JACKSON RESUMED FULL USE
OF HIS WATER RIGHT BY APRIL OF 2013
The District Court found there was no dispute that Jackson partially resumed the water
use on his property in 2012, and that he fully resumed the water use on his property in 2013.
The Barnses attempt to create a material dispute of fact on this issue when none exists. The
District Court found there was no dispute on this issue. Jackson testified that he diverted forty
percent of the available water from Spring Creek and he pumped that water to irrigate his
orchard and other crops. Although Bloxham and another neighbor testified they did not "see"
Jackson irrigating his property, there was no testimony offered to contradict Jackson's diversion
and beneficial use testimony. It should be noted that given Bloxham' s open hostility to the
Jackson's water rights from the beginning, his credibility is questionable.

Jackson has

additionally explained that his neighbor Henderson' s view of the Jackson property is obstructed
by a berm, and he would not know whether Jackson was irrigating his property.
On appeal , the Bamses ask this Court to speculate from the volume of water they are
estimating was diverted that this did not represent forty percent of the available water from
Spring Creek.

Appellant's Brief p. 39.

In support the Bamses reference an interrogatory

response that succinctly summarizes Jackson' s water use in 2013 , but ignores the fuller
deposition and affidavit testimony that full y explained it. (R.

) This is not a material fact in

dispute.
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D. AS THE HOLDER OF THE PARENT WATER RIGHT, BLOXHAM COULD
NOT BE BOTH THE "OWNER"

OF THE PROPERTY ABLE TO

PARTIALLY FORFEIT WATER RIGHTS ON HIS PROPERTY, AND
SIMULTANEOUSLY BE THE THIRD PARTY IN INTEREST/JUNIOR
WATER RIGHTS HOLDER ABLE TO PREVENT RESUMPTION OF
WATER RIGHTS WHEN HE PARTITIONED THE SAME PROPERTY
Bloxham relies on Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831,
70 P.3d 669 (2003) ("Sagewillow JI) to assert that he was a third party in interest using the water
that he had forfeited by not watering what subsequently became the Jackson property. Bloxham
claims that he was both the owner to the entire parcel able to forfeit the water right, and that by
the same conduct of using that "forfeited" water on what subsequently became the Barnes'
property, when he partitioned his own property for sale through bankruptcy, he became a third
pm1y to his own forfeiture. This circular logic makes no sense, and it is not supported by any
previous holdings of this Court.
In Sagewillavv JI, this Court recognized a possibility that junior water rights holders who
begin using water when senior rights are forfeited could prevent a resumption of use argument
and preserve the forfeiture . In that case, a landowner applied to the Department to change the
place of use of numerous ground and surface water rights that originally had been authorized for
irrigation of up to 2,390 acres in the Little Lost River Basin. Two of the ground water rights
appurtenant to approximately 640 acres had been appropriated in the 1960s to facilitate obtaining
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federal desert land entry ("DLE") patents, and thereafter had been abandoned. Between the late
1960s and 1989, no more than 1,412 acres had ever been irrigated under the remaining rights by
Sagewillow's predecessor in interest.

In 1989, Sagewillow purchased the property and

immediately began redeveloping the irrigation system.

By 1994, Sagewillow had brought

approximately 2,390 acres back under irrigation, and then sought to change the place of use of
the rights to reflect how they were then being used. The Department held that the two ground
water rights appurtenant to 640 DLE acres had been forfeited in their entirety and ·that the
portions of the remaining rights appurtenant to anything more than 1,412 acres also had been
forfeited. The Department approved the transfer on condition that Sagewillow could irrigate no
more than 1,412 acres. On appeal , the primary issue was whether Sagewillow had lawfully
resumed the water rights and thereby avoided forfeiture.
This Court held that common law resumption remains a valid defense to forfeiture that
can be defeated by a showing that a third party has made a "claim of right" to the water prior to
the senior's resumption of use. A third party has made a claim ofright to the water if he has: 1)
instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture ; 2) obtained a valid water right authorizing the use
of such water with a priority date prior to the resumption; or 3) used the water pursuant to an
existing right.

This Court also held that the resumption need not be made by the original

appropriator, but must be upon the lands to which the water right originally was appurtenant.
This Court additionally held that resuming the use of only a portion of the forfeited or
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abandoned right will not prevent a loss of the non-resumed portion. Sagewillow II, 138 Idaho at
842, 70 P.3d at 680.
This Court remanded the case to the Department for further proceedings, to determine if
there were any junior water rights holders who were relying on the forfeited water rights and
could be affected by Sagewillow's application. Id.
This Court has held that only property owners, and not the beneficial users, of water
rights are able to forfeit those water rights through nonuse. Aberdeen Springfield Canal Co. v.
Peiper, 133 Idaho 87,982 P.2d 917 (1999). The Peiper rule has been broadened and codified by

Idaho Code § 42-223(7), but the common law rule has not been changed legislatively.
In the instant case, Bloxham urges this Court to treat him as the owner of the water right
able to forfeit the right under the Peiper rule, but to also treat him as a junior water right holder
in relationship to Jackson under the Sagewillow II rule, so that he could prevent Jackson's
resumption of use.

He asked to be treated by the law as two different parties to the same

transaction, even though it is the very same conduct he is alleging that created both the
forfeiture, and which should also prevent the resumption of use: Bloxham chose not to water the
part of his parcel that became the Jackson parcel, and he chose to use all of his water on the part
of his parcel that became the Barnses' property.

Bloxham believes that he "automatically"

became a third party in interest to the entire forfeiture as soon as he became severed from the
Jackson property when he transferred that parcel to the bankruptcy court for sale. This argument
misreads the entire reason for the Sagewillow II rule of law. The Sagewillow 11 rule is intended
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to protect junior water rights users who have begun using the water previously forfeited by
senior water rights users. This is consistent with the idea that when senior water rights are
forfeited, they revert to the State so they can be re-appropriated to junior users for beneficial use.

Jenkins v. State Dep'tofWater Resources, 103 Idaho 384,647 P.2d 1256 (1982).
Bloxham was not a junior water rights user to Jackson, and he was not a senior water
rights user to Jackson. His water rights were identical in priority at all times to Jackson, because
Jackson's water rights derived from Bloxham' s. The priority date for all three of the rights in
question, 29-10420 (the parent right), 29-14032 (Jackson's right), and 29-14115 (Bamses' right),
was March 22, 2004.

(R. 288-293; 308).

Bloxham was not a junior water rights holder who

could protect his water use based on forfeiture under Sagewillow II. Sage·willow 11 is inapposite.
The Barnses cannot use their predecessor in interest's reliance on an alleged water rights
forfeiture of his own water right to prevent resumption of use by an equal successor of that same
water right.

E. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF JACKSON
The District Court properly denied summary judgment for the Barnses and granted
summaiy judgment for Jackson. There are no material facts in dispute on the issues decided by
the District Court. There are disputes of fact related to whether Bloxham irrigated the property
that became the Barnes' and to what extent he irrigated that property. There are disputes of fact
related to whether Bloxham irrigated the property that became the Jackson's. These disputes of
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fact do not prevent the granting of summary judgment, however, because even assuming the
facts as the Barnses have stated, for all the reasons set forth above, their arguments fail as a
matter of law.

V.

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in Jackson's favor.
This Court should affirm the findings that there was no forfeiture on Bloxham's unified parcel,
regardless of where he put his water to beneficial use, because the evidence is undisputed there
was not enough water to satisfy his full water right for the place of use. Idaho law and rulings of
the SRBA consistently hold it is use of the water, and not use of the land, which control the
forfeiture analysis .
This Court can affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the alternative
ground that while the property was in bankruptcy, Bloxham could not take any act to forfeit the
water rights on that property because of the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code,
which are intended to protect the value of assets in bankruptcy. The Barnses have offered no
legitimate argument to the contrary.
Even if this Court found a forfeiture occurred, because Jackson fully resumed water use on
his property consistent with his water right in April 2013, and because the Barnses did not file
their forfeiture action until August 2014, their action must be dismissed. There is no genuine
dispute of material fact on this issue.
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This Court must reject the Barnses' attempt to conflate their predecessor in interests ' roles in
the alleged forfeiture of water rights, to permit a rule where the owner of a water right can
simultaneously forfeit that right and rely on that forfeiture as a "junior user" to their own water
right. Such a rule of law is illogical, and it does not advance any legitimate water rights law
policy. This Court must reject the legal gymnastics Barnes is asking this Court to engage in,
because it is not consistent with the larger policy concerns of Idaho water rights law.
Landowners should not be permitted unilaterally to concentrate their water rights on smaller
acreage than was appropriated in order to increase property values, or for any other reason. They
should not be permitted to foreclose the opportunity for resumption of use of the alleged
forfeiture of water simply by portioning their un-watered land. Landowners should be permitted
to make decisions within their points of use regarding the most efficient and beneficial use of
their water when there is insufficient water to satisfy their rights. For all the reasons previously
discussed, the rule of law advocated by the Barnes would lead to illogical results inconsistent
with the broader policies of Idaho water rights law, of preserving water rights for beneficial use
on the land to which it was appropriated.
The District Court correctly recognized the logical flaws of the Barnses' legal analysis, and
the logical inconsistency of their arguments, and the inconsistency with established water rights
law in Idaho.

This Court should affirm the dismissal of the Barnses' claims on summary

judgment.
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Dated this 25 1h day of July, 2017.
MERRILL AND MERRILL CHARTERED
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned does hereby ce1iify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance with
all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served .on each
party at the following email addresses:
Dated and certified this 25 1h day of July, 2017.

MaryE. S~a
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of July 2017, two true and correct copies of
Respondent' s Brief were served by email and mailed, postage prepaid, on the following:
Robert E. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, PLLC
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Email: rh arris@ holdenlegal.com
ara,vlings@,holdenle2:al .com

Dated and certified this 25th day of July, 2017.
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ADDENDUM
In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(g), Jackson submits the following maps which
depict the place of use of Water Right 29-10420 in 2004, 2006, and 2009 (R. at 267-269).
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